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ABC Channel 2’s compelling and controversial dramatisation of the bitter and protracted 1998 
national waterfront dispute, ‘Bastard Boys’, contained fleeting glimpses of friendly police 
accommodation of the sacked wharfies. One scene, depicting operational police dancing the 
macarena with the picketing wharfies, trivialised both the significance of the police peacekeeping 
strategy and the intricacies of the tense police-union relationship. This paper argues that police 
around Australia generally adopted a negotiated, conciliatory, non-confrontational approach 
with the Maritime Union of Australia picketers and supporters. This strategy was based on 
protocols and procedures that had been developing between the police and the union movement 
for a decade. Police, however, maintained the capacity to use force at any stage of the conflict. The 
paper contends that the police strategy rejected pressure and criticism from a New Right agenda 
that clamoured for violent police intervention. 
Introduction 
Locally produced dramas about Australian politics, especially focusing on industrial 
relations events, are rare. The ABC’s brilliant, entertaining and timely dramatisation 
of the bitter and protracted 1998 national waterfront dispute raises compelling 
questions about arguably Australia’s biggest and most significant industrial dispute 
since the pitched battles between police and stevedores on the Australian wharves in 
the late 1920s (Baker 2005, pp. 38-42). 
The title, ‘Bastard Boys’, originates from a phrase of Chris Corrigan’s former 
Hungarian boss who used to extol his young workers ‘freezing our balls off’ at 3am 
in the market gardens around Mittagaong to ‘work harder, bastard boys’ (Blundell 
2007). Who are the ‘bastard boys’ of the 1998 conflict? If the answer is the Maritime 
Union of Australia (MUA)  members, who were sacked in the middle of the night by 
their employer and who subsequently established ‘community assemblies’ to defy 
Patrick stevedoring activity, they needed to be monitored and controlled. Hence, 
police played an important role in the processes that took place on the wharves, 
unfortunately one that received minimal attention in the mini-series. 
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The ABC classified ‘Bastard Boys’ as a drama, not a documentary, although 
some debate has focused on whether the two part series formed a hybrid, a 
docudrama (Adams 2007). The mini-series, which attracted 972,000 viewers for Part 
One and 915,000 for Part Two, was based on the book by Sydney Morning Herald 
journalists, Helen Trinca and Anne Davies (2000) entitled Waterfront: the battle that 
changed Australia. Trinca described the television program as ‘a ripper story but it’s a 
complex one’ (Trinca 2007). The mini-series was fictionalised but real people’s names 
and events were depicted. Patrick’s chairman, Chris Corrigan, dismissed the 
program as having ‘an occasional acquaintance with actual events’ (Australian, 17 
May 2007). By contrast, the ACTU’s Greg Combet claimed that the ‘events were 
much as shown on the TV show, but the characters and the script are dramatised’ 
(Kermond 2007). 
It is necessary to provide a brief explanation of the industrial context that 
necessitated police involvement in the waterfront dispute. The Federal Government, 
headstrong for waterfront reform, repeatedly expressed support for any employer or 
port authority enterprises that sought waterfront reforms. The attempt by the US 
shipping company, International Purveyors, in September 1997 to sack unionised 
wharfies and replace them with non-union labour on the Cairns waterfront proved 
abortive. The chairman of Patrick Stevedoring, Chris Corrigan, admitted direct 
involvement in a futile and clandestine attempt to train non-union labour in Dubai 
(mostly former SAS commandos and army members). Patrick, encouraged by the 
Howard Government, determined to replace its fully unionised workforce with non-
unionists trained by a National Farmers’ Federation directed company. Clandestinely, 
the MUA workforce was transferred to the employment of a shelf company with no 
assets (Peetz 1999, p. 4). On 7 April 1998, Patrick Stevedoring sacked its entire 1,400 
permanent workforce and 600 casual workers, all MUA members, who were locked 
out of their workplaces. The waterfront dispute had connotations of being 
‘manufactured’ and based on ‘trickery’. The Opposition and unions argued that if 
stevedores could be summarily sacked, so could anyone (McGregor 1998). 
The ‘Bastard Boys’ drama presented the basic narrative of the 1998 Australian 
maritime dispute, heralded as the ‘War on the Wharves’.  On 9 April 1998, the Age 
banner read ‘Dock Wars’ while the Australian proclaimed ‘War on the Waterfront’. A 
definitive Prime Ministerial quote declared it ‘A defining moment in Australia’s 
industrial history’ (Oakham and Baker 1999, pp. 127-149).  An Age review of ‘Bastard 
Boys’ (Enker 2007) labelled the dispute as one of ‘such violent confrontation’. This 
was the very possibility that the police-union negotiations succeeded in preventing 
and this is why re-visiting the policing of the 1998 MUA dispute is significant in 
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terms of the policing of public order. Despite the employment of security guards in 
balaclavas, guard dogs and clandestine efforts to replace union members on the 
wharves, this predicted ‘war’ failed to culminate in a full-scale, pitched battle 
between union picketers and police. 
Although re-creating the tense and turbulent atmosphere on the wharves, 
‘Bastard Boys’ trivialised the nature and significance of the relationship between 
police and the union movement. ‘Bastard Boys’ contained fleeting glimpses of 
friendly police accommodation of the sacked union members and police passivity 
towards the firebrands. One scene depicting operational police dancing the 
macarena with the picketing wharfies trivialised both the significance of the police 
peacekeeping strategy and the intricacies of the tense police-union relationship. 
Journalist Andrew Bolt seized on this scene to reinforce the New Right credence of 
police failure to perform their duty. Bolt’s words of ‘police doing the Macarena with 
the nice wharfies on the picket line’ (Bolt 2007) is a sarcastic indictment of police 
professionalism.  Robert Fidgeon, in the Herald-Sun (14 May 2007), directed viewers 
of Part Two to look for ‘the sympathy that police have for the union members fearful 
of their future’. These are the only two reports or commentaries of the TV miniseries, 
viewed from eighty newspaper reports, which make any reference to the police-
union relationship. 
One critic alleged that the drama ‘never feels as dangerous as it should’ 
(Belleman 2007). The five months of the waterfront dispute were bitter, volatile, 
explosive and emotionally charged. The extent of the danger and unpredictable 
nature of the national dispute was perhaps best presented by the Chief 
Commissioner of the Victoria Police, Neil Comrie, who feared ‘serious injury and 
even loss of life to a number of people’ if full-scale pitched battle between picketers 
and police had erupted (3LO Terry Laidler program 17 March 1999). 
The Emergence of Modern Policing of Industrial Disputation 
Historically, in periods of bitter industrial strife in Australia, police usually did not 
stand in the middle as neutral arbiters of the law but served employer and 
government demands for decisive action. Employers have customarily relied on the 
apparatus of the state in the form of the police to make their plants accessible, to 
protect staff and strikebreakers and to safeguard business productivity. Police, with 
batons, escorting strikebreakers to the workplace was the catalyst that inflamed 
violent confrontation between unionists and police. Though not consistent 
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throughout history, police actions at specific times and during specific conflicts 
attempted to suppress picket activities, left-wing agitation and unemployment 
dissent (Baker 2001). 
As the coercive arm and guardian of the state, aggressive police historically 
quelled hostile industrial unrest. Police played an essential, but ruthless and 
partisan, role in the course of some protracted disputes such as the Great Strikes of 
the 1890s, 1917 general strikes, 1928 waterfront strikes, 1937 Korumburra lockout 
and 1964-5 Mt Isa lock-out (Baker 2005, pp. 50-81). When political and ideological 
clashes between capital and labour were rife amidst the communist hysteria of the 
1920s, police saw themselves as defenders of freedom and enforcers of legitimate 
power against waterside workers (Baker 2001). As both employers and unionists 
have realised, the one rapid method of demolishing a picket line was for police to 
smash through it (Trinca and Davies 2000, p. 198). 
More sophisticated policing of industrial strife has emerged in recent decades. 
The advent of the mobile camera in the 1970s, a boon for accountability, had a 
sanguine effect on both the policing of work-sites and union protests. Better-
educated, management-trained and media-savvy police leaders and union 
organisers with greater knowledge of civil rights have fostered communication, 
liaison and cooperation. When large numbers are gathered in protest or blockade, 
police are unable to move and arrest all people who are technically breaking a law 
and whose conviction is problematic in the courts. The prudent police approach, 
evidenced in the 1992 Associated Pulp and Paper Mill dispute at Burnie, is often to 
forego arrests (or pursue a minimum arrest policy) and to preserve the peace (Baker 
2005, pp. 82-137). Worker violence, even for a valid cause, erodes public sympathy 
and support just as police coercion can do.  Unions may be generally accepted for 
safeguarding employees' economic and working conditions but they are vilified if 
industrial action turns violent (Grant and Wallace 1991, p. 1,119).  The legitimacy of 
policing is questioned if police adopt unnecessarily paramilitary tactics against 
strikers. 
Despite ‘setbacks’ of the Richmond Secondary College baton-attack type (Perry 
1994), the primary source of improved public order policing, especially the handling 
of industrial disputation, is to advance formal cooperation and flexibility between 
the parties. Formalised negotiated management between police leaders and union 
organisers has lessened the extent of coercive policing intervention through an 
emphasis on peacekeeping and prevention rather than rigid law enforcement. 
Contemporary policing of public disorder, including industrial disputes, is generally 
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characterised by under-enforcement of the law, complex procedures of negotiation 
and large-scale gathering of prevention-oriented information and intelligence 
(Kratcoski et al. 2001; Waddington 2001). 
Police facing picket-line confrontation cannot afford to lose; police believe they 
must ‘win’ the initial battle in order to hold the day and future industrial encounters.  
As industrial disputes are eventually settled, the uncertainty relates to the timing of 
the settlement. The police attitude, therefore, has evolved to one of ‘hastening 
slowly’ so that the parties to the industrial dispute have time to negotiate (Winther 
interviews 1998 and 2001). For unionists, contemporary violent confrontation with 
police is generally a no-win situation because police can utilise their resources, 
mobility and riot technology if they envisage the situation as demanding it. Despite 
considerable militaristic capabilities, it is pertinent to note that in Australia riot 
personnel and technology have only been deployed on a limited basis to date.  Yet 
such paramilitary weaponry exists, it is available if required and union organisers 
know this. 
As a result of violent clashes between police and the Builders Labourers 
Federation in the 1980s, Victoria Police and the Victorian Trades Hall Council 
(VTHC) established professional protocol arrangements to deal with potentially 
volatile situations. (Previously, Victoria Police had relied on a call to Russell Street 
Headquarters and then randomly allocated an available sergeant to the industrial 
duties.) Victoria Police established the position of Industrial Disputation Officer to 
liaise with employer, unions and government in order to provide practical and 
pragmatic advice to operational police about industrial law and ‘desirable 
procedures for the policing of picket lines’ in terms of available numbers, location, 
timing, acceptable behaviour and control contingencies. In accord with policing 
philosophy, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) executive developed a 
reciprocal union policy in relation to authorised strikes and pickets to avoid 
confrontation by contact being established ‘at the earliest opportunity, between 
union officials and local police to establish the nature of the dispute, the role of 
police and to identify representatives from the union(s) with whom the police can 
liaise’ (ACTU/VTHC memorandum May 1994). The policing of the1998 industrial 
conflict was not a spontaneous happening; the seeds of the police and union ‘accord’, 
based on communication and negotiated management of potential conflict scenarios, 
had been nurturing for about a decade as both police and unionists sought to avoid 
violence, adverse publicity and litigation. 
Baker, D (2007/8) 10 Flinders Journal of Law Reform  361
Police and Trades Hall Councils co-operate in relation to notification of rallies, 
boundaries, routes and acceptable picketing practices. If police are called to a 
dispute, either major or minor, they ‘take control of it’ (Winther interview 2001). 
Police prefer an identifiable group to constrain and contain because unknown 
picketers, outsiders, can elicit an unexpected police response (Kahn et al. 1983, pp. 
86-91). Although there are no laws specifically prohibiting picketing, ‘they are 
subject to the laws necessary for the maintenance of public order’ such as traffic 
violations, assault, obstruction, trespass, besetting, harassment, intimidation or 
failing to obey a lawful police order (Police Gazette 28 April 1997, paragraphs 42 and 
23). The employer can opt to pursue civil litigation to restrain unions from any 
unlawful and disruptive action. Interference with contractual relations, nuisance, 
intimidation, trespass and harm to business can constitute industrial torts and possible 
claims for damages (Douglas 2004, pp. 93-101). Judicial statements can override a 
policing strategy and even set precedents, as occurred with Justice Wright during the 
1992 APPM dispute (Wright 1992). 
The Reality of Policing the 1998 National Waterfront Dispute 
The 1998 maritime dispute centred on the courts, the political arena and the media, 
but the wharves remained a symbolic theatre of the struggle and the core of the 
grassroots campaign. Mass picketing, disciplined and resolute, on the wharves 
prevented a quick, decisive victory by Patrick Stevedores and the Howard 
Government. The peaceful, non-criminal pickets were the visible centre-piece of the 
union's campaign, the focus of national and international media coverage and the 
platform of civil disobedience. The ‘consensual’ tactics of the police complemented 
the tight discipline and control imposed by picket captains and marshals on 
thousands of protesters. Tensions at docks such as East Swanson, Fremantle, Botany, 
Brisbane and Newcastle were acute at various stages. The almost surreal uncertainty 
of the course and outcome of the dispute was exemplified in a newspaper account, 
entitled ‘A divided nation united only by sheer anxiety’, which was accompanied by 
photographs of wharfies and supporters, with arms linked, facing rows upon rows 
of police (Sunday Australian, 19 April 1998). Close physical contact between police 
and picketers demands self-control and discipline from both parties. Certain 
newspapers and politicians predicted future bloodshed, but such prophecies were 
not self-fulfilling (Carney 1998). 
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The large-scale 1998 Australian waterfront dispute revealed the effectiveness of 
community union protest and the desirability of negotiation, compromise and 
formal protocol between the union movement and state police in order to maintain 
peaceful protest (Baker 2005, pp.163-203). Despite sackings by Patrick Stevedoring 
company on 7 April 1998 and the stationing of security guards and rottweilers to 
protect Patrick terminals, the union movement refrained from unlawful responses 
and from calling a national strike (Lee 1998, p.111).  The broad reinstatement order 
of Justice North (21 April), which directed Patrick Stevedoring to re-employ its MUA 
workers and which was upheld by the full bench of the Federal Court (23 April) and 
the High Court (4 May), determined the legal and industrial course of events. The 
public opinion ‘battle’ for support, a telling factor in the dispute, gradually moved 
from the company to the sacked unionists (Oakham and Baker 1999). 
Throughout the dispute, the MUA and various union movement officials 
advocated and generally maintained a peaceful, disciplined and law-abiding protest 
determined to gain significant sections of community support. In response, police 
normally adhered to a peace-keeping and non-interventionist philosophy as 
opposed to the rigid law enforcement of arraigning summary offences that are 
basically minor charges (Winther interview 1998). The Victoria Police Chief 
Commissioner's instructions (Police Gazette 28 April 1997, paragraph 30) state that 
minor offences (those common to picketing) should be ‘ignored in the interests of 
containing the overall situation’ in public order situations and not deplete police 
personnel numbers by conducting arrests. 
As police philosophy is to foster relations with both parties, regular 
conferences were conducted with the employer, including security personnel. At the 
beginning of the picketing, the Victoria Police Industrial Disputation Officer 
explained to the union negotiating team the legal requirements as they pertained to 
the state, indicated standards of acceptable behaviour, and identified police 
responsibilities (Nation interview 1998). Daily meetings between police, MUA and 
VTHC negotiators (not seen on ‘Bastard Boys’) were conducted at Police 
Headquarters in order to prevent surprises or a spark such as ‘the headline in a 
newspaper or a piece of gossip’ inflaming the situation around the Australian 
seaports (Boyd interview 1998). Close consultations between the police and union 
negotiating teams took place on days of great industrial volatility.  The intensity of 
the police-union arrangements is evidenced by the high ranking police officers and 
key union negotiators assigned to the meetings.  The Victoria Police negotiating 
team included Assistant Commissioner (General Policing), Allan Roberts, 
Operations Commander, Noel Perry, Industrial Disputation Officer, Chief Inspector 
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John Winther and Acting Superintendent (Forward Command), Daryl Nation, while 
their union counterparts were MUA Deputy Secretary, John Higgins, National 
Organiser of the MUA, Mick O’Leary, CFMEU Secretary and VTHC Vice-President, 
Martin Kingham, VTHC Industrial Campaign Officer including police liaison, Brian 
Boyd and VTHC Assistant Secretary, Natalie Sykes. 
The VTHC and the MUA welcomed the police briefings and presence because 
they sought neither confrontation with police nor the stigma of violence.  A special 
mobile telephone listing of key personnel was kept by both police and union 
negotiators (Winther interview 1998). Victoria Police viewed the consultation as an 
extension of its Project Beacon training, seeking non-violent strategies to control 
potentially dangerous situations and emphasising ‘safety first’ rather than a police 
culture of ‘risk-taking’ (Victoria Police 1997, pp. 4 and 59-60). In a reciprocal 
arrangement, MUA officials pledged that they would maintain control of the 
‘peaceful assembly’. (Higgins interview 28 May 1998) Specific, unwritten guarantees 
on trust were given by both police and union negotiators. In Victoria, MUA officials 
made commitments of no violence, only routine yelling at change-overs of non-
union labour while police agreed not to employ shields, batons and horses to 
intimidate protesters. In most states, union leaders imposed bans on swearing, racial 
abuse and alcohol (West Australian, 13 April 1998, p. 4). According to Chief Inspector 
Winther (interview 22 May 2001), MUA marshals were ‘completely successful’ in 
organising and sustaining ‘a peaceful community protest’. The MUA’s John Higgins 
(interview 1998) had ‘no criticism whatsoever’ of the police role. From a police 
perspective, there was little law to enforce and insufficient criminal activity to 
warrant a violent affray. 
Policing the docks, however, was far from macarena and cricket! The initial 
police forays to break MUA pickets in New South Wales and Western Australia had 
proven abortive and influenced police thinking and strategy in all states about the 
futility of attempting to break large-scale community pickets that out-numbered 
police. In Sydney, police detained, then released, twenty-two protesters at Port 
Botany (Kennedy et al. 1998). Queensland Police, on 21 April, arrested 184 passive 
protesters for disobeying police direction and trespass but MUA official, Mick Carr, 
proclaimed:  ‘The relationship between rank and file police officers and the MUA 
has been very, very good indeed’ (7.30 Report 22 April 1998). The Queensland Police 
boasted of their ability peacefully to remove protesters due to the specialist training 
of their dedicated Public Safety and Response Team. 
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In Western Australia police played a more aggressive, interventionist and 
legalistic role, although violence was still largely avoided. In accord with traditional 
police acquiescence to employer requests to remove pickets, 120 police, including the 
tactical response group and the independent patrol group attired in riot gear, used 
batons to disperse a union protest at Fremantle on 16 April (West Australian 17 April 
1998, pp.1 and 7). The sortie of the Western Australia riot police was a ‘tactical 
blunder’ which tarnished the police image at a time when policing rhetoric extolled 
the importance of developing community links (Cooke interview 1998). 
The potential for violent confrontation was most pronounced at East Swanson 
Dock, Melbourne, which became the focus of mass picketing and the litmus test of 
the industrial dispute. The MUA’s civil disobedience attracted numerous celebrity 
figures.  Railway tracks, welded together as a ‘community arts project’, crossed the 
road to the quay and concrete blocks were erected on the entrance road. The 
‘community assembly’, with its soup kitchens, toilet facilities, BBQs and even 
entertainment and celebrities, became a semi-permanent and symbolic form of civil 
disobedience. Although the MUA’s ‘community assembly’ was technically an 
obstruction, senior Victoria Police acted upon operational police discretion to avoid 
bloodshed on the streets. 
On 17 April, Victoria Police notified the union negotiators that they would be 
removing the picket line because it was blocking vehicle access to the port. They 
informed the negotiators that there would be no riot shields, no truncheons, no 
excessive physical force and that horses would not lead the operation. In return, the 
unions agreed to safeguard women and children; there would be no violence, only 
passive resistance (Higgins interview 1998). Near dawn on Saturday, 18 April, 1,000 
police confronted a determined opposition from 4,000 MUA members and 
supporters, later augmented by 2,000 construction workers.  The police were 
effectively encircled and forced to retreat with the aid of union officials who led the 
police safely through the crowd (Trinca and Davies 2000, p. 218). According to 
Bramble (1998, p. 16), the police ‘had to beg to be let out!’ This scenario had posed 
the greatest potential for violence.  Strategically, the lack of open space at the dock 
limited police ability to manoeuvre the throng of people. Two small entrances were 
seized for four hours by police but no truck driver was prepared to enter the dock. 
The union movement hailed this outcome as a very significant victory, both as a 
physical encounter and a symbolic industrial one. According to Greg Combet, ‘That 
day turned the dispute … They (police) appreciated that it wasn’t violent - that was 
very important tactically and when that assault was turned back … it was a decisive 
moment’ (quoted in Pocock 1999, p. 28). ‘Bastard Boys’, produced without 
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consultation with key police players in the protracted dispute, undermines the 
unpredictability and volatility of the East Swanson impasse: the police Commander 
is depicted as being sympathetic to the unionists, even suggesting they join police 
‘for a beer’ the next morning. 
Intense discussions occurred between police and union organisers in order to 
maintain the peace. While the court outcomes in relation to the legality of the Patrick 
sackings and the alleged Government involvement in contravention of its own 1996 
Workplace Relations Act were eagerly anticipated, a truce ensued in Melbourne (much 
to Corrigan’s disgust) between police and picketers in which ‘both parties were true 
to their word’ (Winther interview 1998). Police promised that no trucks would 
convey freight from the docks and they would not attempt to move union pickets 
(Towers 1998). When this peace agreement expired, police resumed talks rather than 
attempt to break the pickets. Some discussions were very ‘heated’: the physical 
blockades and obstructions to freedom of movement on the port were sources of 
bickering between union and police negotiators and of frustration and 
inconvenience to the employer (Baker 2005, pp. 168-173). 
Top-level police played a role in the dispute’s unravelling. In an unprecedented 
and significant initiative, state police commissioners, at their annual conference in 
Melbourne on 21 April, issued a statement advocating a ‘negotiated’ and ‘non-
violent’ resolution of the maritime dispute. Conscious of the ‘complex and emotive’ 
nature of the dispute, the commissioners stressed that police would act as necessary 
to deal with unlawful blockades but reaffirmed ‘their strong desire that the maritime 
dispute is settled through negotiations and the legal processes rather than violent 
conflict’ (Millett et al. 1998). The police commissioners advocated a low-key, non-
confrontational approach instead of coercive tactics: ‘Physical contact on the 
wharves is likely to lead to violence and perhaps serious injury to participants and 
police’ (Reynolds 1998). After the commissioners’ communique, police made no 
further attempt to remove picket lines at the Patrick terminals. 
Having failed to defeat the MUA at the dock gates, the Federal Government 
reproached some state police forces for ‘limp responses’ in implementing Supreme 
Court orders against the picketers (Age 4 April 1998, p.13). Prime Minister Howard 
insisted that state police enforce court injunctions against picketers delaying cargo 
on Sydney and Melbourne wharves and branded open defiance of the law as ‘very 
unsatisfactory’ (Millett et al. 1998). Victorian Premier Kennett, in private talks with 
Police Command, insisted that the blockade be broken (Age: News Extra 9 December 
2000). Della Porta (1996, p. 29) conjectures that in Europe, ‘police forces will fulfil 
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demands by the government’, overriding democratic rights of protest. But this 
certainly did not occur during the 1998 Australian dispute. 
Criticism from employer and conservative politicians focused on the police’s 
inaction against the MUA assemblies. Victoria Police Command, exhibiting 
independence from political pressure, ensured that police members were not 
manipulated in the dispute. Chief Commissioner Comrie, boasting of a record of 
managing disputes with ‘minimal violence’, refused to enter ‘battle mode’ and be 
‘pushed into using excessive force’ (Courier Mail 20 April 1998). Patrick’s 
Chairperson, Chris Corrigan, castigated the very lack of action by Victoria Police for 
allowing the continuance of the MUA pickets, being ‘neither peaceful nor legal’, and 
thereby creating an allegedly unlawful impasse obstructing commerce (Corrigan 
speech 13 May 1998). Although Patrick Stevedoring made no official complaint 
about the policing of the dispute, company criticism of the police vehemently 
challenged the belief that the protests and pickets were peaceful and non-violent. 
Corrigan labelled the picketers as the ‘couple of thousand rent-a-crowd at East 
Swanson dock’  (Corrigan speech 13 May 1998), a description very much at odds 
with that provided by the police.   Corrigan’s most ardent attack was directed 
against the Victoria Police, especially for its ineptitude against the MUA ‘assembly’: 
‘The unpleasant reality is that the police in Melbourne did not do their job’.(Corrigan 
speech, 16 March 1999)  He scorned Victoria Police’s time delaying ‘while the police 
sniff the wind to see who’s winning the public relations war before deciding 
whether to enforce the law’ (Kermond 1998). Corrigan and other critics appear to 
have acted upon the traditional assumption that, if the employer demands police 
intervention to clear passage, police will automatically and immediately concur 
without consideration of the consequences. 
The 1998 police-union protocols and non-confrontational policing of industrial 
disputation have been challenged by a New Right agenda. Stuart Wood (1998), an 
industrial relations barrister acting for Patrick, presented a paper to the H. R. 
Nicholls Society on the failings of the Victoria Police during the dispute ‘to control 
the violence and respond to the threat to kill; to clear the trespassers from the docks’. 
Wood (1998, pp.15 and 23-25) argued that the future policing of pickets should 
include no police consultation with ‘persons determined to break the law’, 
presumably any picketer. He advocated the ‘establishment of a specially trained, 
rapid response industrial disputes unit’. Similarly, Des Moore, director of the right-
wing ‘think-tank’, the Institute for Private Enterprise, condemned ‘the abysmal 
failure of the police to enforce the law in the waterfront dispute’ and for encouraging 
‘violent actions by protesters’ (Moore 1998).  During a dispute at Feltex carpet 
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manufacturing in November 2001, Moore, maintaining his crusade against perceived 
police ineffectiveness, claimed that Victoria Police ‘upset’ the company by 
continuing ‘their very poor record in handling violence at industrial disputes’ 
(Moore 2001). Such comments, in effect, constitute a call for a return to the 
traditional, militaristic style policing response to strikes of the late 1920s. The 
potentially dire consequences of police pursuing such a confrontational approach are 
evident by the violent ramifications of much historical policing of industrial conflict 
(Baker 2002). 
Victoria Police, acting according to legal advice, delayed any sortie against 
picket lines until the Federal and High Court decisions were announced.  According 
to Victoria Police Industrial Disputation Officer, John Winther (interview 2005), 
(who stressed ‘the seriousness of the dispute – anything can happen’), police 
believed that ‘the ultimate decision came out of the courts which resolved the issue’. 
Police would have appeared ‘rather foolish’ if they had intervened hastily before the 
High Court ruling and as the tide of public opinion moved in favour of the union 
movement. Just as the leading players in the dispute awaited the major court 
decisions, senior police awaited the decisions in order to maintain or change 
operations. Police autonomy means that they can reject pressure from a particular 
vested interest in a dispute, such as Patrick’s Chairman and the Prime Minister, but 
court injunctions are obeyed  (Baker 2005, pp. 105-130). If Justice North’s 
interlocutory orders had gone against the MUA in April 1998, Victoria Police had 
alternative, detailed, coercive operational plans to smash the picketing (Nation 
interview 1998). In such a tense political and industrial climate, the police-union 
relationship would have been fully tested. 
Whether or not Victoria Police would have successfully dismantled the pickets 
remains contentious because the MUA, via the ‘telephone tree’, was capable of 
rallying masses at East Swanson Dock in such an eventuality. With the multitude of 
roving TV cameras and outside radio broadcasts, violent clashes between police and 
picketers would have served neither's interest. ‘Bastard Boys’ challenges the viewer 
to decide whose interests would have been served by bloody, violent clashes 
between police and the MUA. Philosophically, Victoria Police rhetoric states that 
success is ‘primarily judged by the extent to which the use of force is avoided or 
minimised’ (Police Gazette 28 April 1997). According to senior Victoria Police, the lack 
of arrests, complaints and injuries justified ‘a good result’ for a hundred days’ 
operation (Winther interview 2001). 
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Modern-day police leaders throughout Australia are aware of the risks of 
attempting to smash through mass picketing. Similarly, experienced union 
organisers have seen the folly of physical confrontation with police, who are not the 
adversary in disputes. The ACTU, in July 2003, announced a new and expanded 
picket code that banned unionists from drinking alcohol on picket lines and 
outlawed violence, intimidation and destruction of property. All picketing has to be 
coordinated by union committees; union-appointed marshals must liaise with police 
to resolve any conflicts. The code stressed the need to ‘honour agreements or 
understandings that exist or are reached between police authorities and unions or 
TLCs in respect to picket or demonstration activity’ and ‘to establish protocols with 
police’ to ensure that potential conflicts are resolved (Workers Online 18 July 2003; 
Australian Financial Review 3 July 2003). In April 2006, the NSW Police Association 
stated that its members would not use a water cannon vehicle, purchased by the 
public order and riot squad for $700,000, at union pickets and protests although 
other demonstrators, such as those at APEC in September 2007, might confront a 
different scenario (Morris 2006). 
The policing modus operandi employed in the 1998 waterfront dispute placed 
peace-keeping and public safety above the enforcement of law, the latter of which 
would have assisted commercial enterprises to conduct their business unhindered. 
This low-key strategy necessitated interference to the company’s business and 
transportation of goods and some inconvenience to the general public. Police are 
obliged neither to protect a business interest at any cost nor to placate people’s right 
to protest at any cost. Employers and governments are entitled to criticise and make 
demands but police must safeguard their operational independence. In February 2004, 
newspaper publisher, John Fairfax Holdings Ltd, angrily chastised police for failing 
to take action against unionists blockading the Tullamarine printing plant and 
preventing The Age’s distribution. The Age’s Paul Heinrichs (22 February 2004) 
pontificated that, ‘despite having the rule of law on its side, The Age was unable to 
enlist the assistance of Victoria Police, who were either unwilling or unable to 
enforce law and order’. This dispute once again illustrates an employer still 
expecting and demanding an immediate and aggressive police response to handling 
picketing but such demands can be rejected by modern police operational strategy. 
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Conclusion 
Ray Quint, director of ‘Bastard Boys’, approached an Australian film distributor 
with the program’s concept but he received a terse reply: ‘Mate, there’s no bang. 
Where are all the dead bodies?’ (Blundell 2007).  The fact that the tense 1998 national 
dispute was confined to limited physical confrontation stems primarily from the 
police-union ‘accord’. Both police and unionists derived real benefits from their 
evolving flexible and non-confrontational strategy.  Neither wanted members 
injured; neither wanted adverse media attention; neither wanted prolonged criminal 
litigation; both sought legitimacy from the community. Throughout the explosive 
days of April 1998, both the police and the union movement averted major 
confrontation and violence by concerted negotiation and arrangements. However, 
the police always retained the capacity to act decisively and forcefully to quell unrest 
if compromise and negotiation failed. The Howard Government, Patrick, Corrigan 
and the New Right advocates, who espouse the traditional edict that public police 
should respond quickly and decisively to employer and/or government requests in 
industrial disputes, saw police as the legitimate coercive agent to remove pickets but 
they seemed oblivious to police capacity for operational independence when 
keeping the peace and containing the volatile waterfront. 
The drama, ‘Bastard Boys’, successfully re-visited a seminal event in Australian 
industrial history. It re-told ‘a complex and historically significant story’ (Enker 
2007) by condensing the volatile waterfront dispute into a four-hour dramatisation.  
However, the police-union relationship failed to be represented in its maturity, 
sophistication and complexity. That relationship is part of the 1998 events and it was 
significant in the process, procedures and, arguably, even the outcome of the 
industrial dispute. The police peacekeeping and non-confrontational strategy has 
been tested and has survived but for how long? 
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